Abstract-Industrial Ethernet is a technology widely spread in factory floors and critical infrastructures where a high amount of data need to be collected and transported. Fiber optic networks at gigabit rates fit well with that type of environment, where speed, system performance, and reliability are critical. In this paper, a new encryption method for high-speed optical communications suitable for such kinds of networks is proposed. This new encryption method consists of a symmetric streaming encryption of the 8b/10b data flow at physical coding sublayer level. It is carried out thanks to a format preserving encryption block cipher working in CTR (counter) mode. The overall system has been simulated and implemented in a field programmable gate array. Thanks to experimental results, it can be concluded that it is possible to cipher traffic at this physical level in a secure way. In addition, no overhead is introduced during encryption, getting minimum latency and maximum throughput.
. Simple example of a SCADA network sharing field device traffic and video security. more immunity to electromagnetic interference than other wired systems. Owing to these advantages, a lot of research related with multigigabit optical transceivers has been carried out for applications in industrial environments [4] , [5] .
With respect to wireless systems, optical communications can be considered safer as they do not emit any radiation that can be captured by an intruder. However, the optical signal can be intercepted easily, thanks to fiber coupling devices and electrooptical converters [6] . Moreover, it can be performed without perceptibly interfere in communications.
In layered communication models like OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) or TCP/IP, several encryption techniques can be used to avoid passive eavesdropping. It depends on the communication layer where confidentiality is needed. Many solutions proposed for industrial Ethernet encryption are usually for layers 3 or 4, such as IPsec or transport layer security standards, respectively. These offer security when field buses are attached to IP networks by means of a gateway [7] . Other solutions are proposed for layer 2, such as MACsec standard [8] . Moreover, industrial communication equipment, with layer 2 and layer 3 encryption capabilities, is nowadays available from some vendors, and is used to protect ICS from both internal and external cyberattacks.
Regarding layer 1 encryption in optical communications, there is no proposal for Ethernet. However, there are solutions related with optical technology, such as optical code-division multiplexing [6] , or with physical layer protocols, such as the encryption of optical transport network (OTN) frame payloads [9] . The latter is mainly used by service providers to grant security on the carrier telecommunication networks.
One of the advantages of performing encryption at layer 1 is that no extra data fields are introduced on ciphering packets, unlike protocols at other layers do [10] . Thanks to this, no throughput is wasted for transmitting this extra overhead. For example, OTN commercial equipment is usually able to perform encryption at line rate, achieving a 100% throughput and introducing very low latency [11] , in the range of nanoseconds. It contrasts with other encryption methods, such as IPsec, which usually introduces latencies in the range of milliseconds.
Regarding to Ethernet, 1000Base-X is one of the most widely used physical layer standards at 1 Gbps rate in optical communications, and there is no mechanism providing layer 1 security on it. On the other hand, Gigabit optical Ethernet is widely used in industrial Ethernet networks, where for certain applications a high level of determinism is needed, and there can be strict requirements for network delay and jitter [12] . A physical layer encryption mechanism could provide the mentioned advantages such as zero overhead and low latencies. This kind of 'in-flight' encryption could be useful with real time protocols, such as EtherCAT or PROFINET IRT [12] , [13] , enabling encryption to be performed at line rate.
The main motivation of this paper is to propose and implement an encryption method suitable for the physical coding sublayer (PCS) of the 1000Base-X standard. The physical coding of this Ethernet layer is the well-known 8b/10b encoding. To get "inflight" encryption of the 8b/10b symbol stream, a stream cipher that preserves the format of this codification is necessary.
As far as the authors are concerned, there is no standardized or recommended format preserving stream cipher. However, recently, several format preserving encryption (FPE) modes of operation have been approved by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [14] . The structures described in these modes can be understood as a kind of FPE "block ciphers" [15] that are able to encrypt data in the desired format. Its use in a like of electronic code book mode is proposed to provide security in databases with an arbitrary format [15] or in legacy ICS protocols [16] .
In this paper, CTR (counter) mode is proposed to be used with "FPE block ciphers" to achieve security in high-throughput applications where data format must be preserved. For example, the Gigabit Ethernet 1000Base-X physical layer. This paper is divided into the following sections. In Section II, an introduction to PCS layer encryption necessities is given; in Section III, an introduction to the FPE NIST recommendations is made. In Section IV, security considerations of the proposed structure are given and the analysis of the keystream output is carried out. Subsequently, Section V deals with the practical case for Gigabit Ethernet 1000Base-X layer and the overall structure of the proposed encryption system. In Section VI, the hardware implementation of the cipher is described and results of the encryption are explained. Finally, in Section VII, conclusions are given.
II. CODING PRESERVING ENCRYPTION
Physical coding sublayer is part of the Ethernet 1000Base-X standard and performs functions such as autonegotiation, link establishment, clock rate adaptation, and data encoding. As other high-speed standards, a baseband serial data transmission is carried out while clock frequency information is embedded in the serial bitstream itself. Thanks to bit transitions in the data stream, the clock recovery circuits are able to extract the frequency information at the receiver.
Consequently, serial data sampling is made at the appropriate time. In order to facilitate the work of the clock and data recovery circuit, information must be encoded in such a way that a good transition density and a short run length are achieved. Also a dc-balanced serial data stream must be guaranteed by getting a good disparity.
Block line encoders group input bits into m-bit blocks and map these blocks into n-bit blocks, where n is greater than m. Thanks to the redundancy introduced in data, block encoders achieve the attributes mentioned previously [17] (transition density, short run length, and dc-balance). In the case of 1000Base-X, 8b/10b encoding is used.
Normally, an additive stream cipher is implemented by carrying out the XOR operation between the plaintext and a keystream obtained from a secure pseudorandom generator. In case of encrypting physical layer when block-line encoding is used, it is necessary to preserve the mentioned encoder properties; therefore, the location of the encryptor in the datapath must be taken into account. In the case of a block line code such as 8b/10b, encryption should be carried out before the encoder and the XOR operation would not be suitable. An m-bit symbol should be encrypted giving rise to another m-bit symbol, within the alphabet of symbols supported by the encoding standard. If R is the number of possible symbols, then the operation performed by the stream cipher should be a modulo-R addition instead of an XOR. Moreover, m-bit symbols should be mapped in a value between 0 and R − 1 before this addition, and the resulting value should be reverse-mapped to the corresponding new m-bit symbols that are finally encoded.
In Fig. 2 , the generic mechanism is shown with such kind of encoding. The m-bit symbols are mapped to b-bit values that are encrypted, reverse-mapped, and, finally, encoded into n-bit words. In addition to these operations, the keystream generator must be able to produce a uniformly distributed keystream in the range of the available alphabet of symbols. To achieve this, in this paper, CTR mode is proposed to be used with FPE block ciphers. FPE modes are introduced in Section III, and security considerations of the overall structure are given in Section IV. 
III. FPE CIPHER MODES
FPE encrypts plaintext in a ciphertext, preserving its original format and length. Some examples where this type of encryption is useful are the primary account numbers or social security numbers for which standard block ciphers or their operating modes would not preserve the format. Currently, two operation modes for FPE are recommended by NIST, FF1, and FF3 [14] . Both "ciphers" (actually, they are considered operation modes) have a scheme based on a nonbinary Feistel structure. In NIST recommendations, the underlying round function of the Feistel network consists of an advanced encryption standard (AES) block cipher, although in its original specifications this pseudorandom function (PRF) can be also implemented by a hash function based on hash-based message authentication code [18] .
The main differences between both modes, FF1 and FF3, are the number of rounds in the Feistel structure (with a smaller number in FF3) and the way to achieve the arbitrary length message encryption. In the case of FF1, its specification allows message lengths up to 2 32 words, whereas in FF3 message length is more limited and it is constrained by the input data radix. However, in the original proposal for FF3, also called Brier, Peyrin, and Stern (BPS), the basic block cipher component BPS-BC is proposed to be used in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode for encryption of arbitrary length messages [14] . In spite of this, CBC operation mode properties result in frequent misuse among classical confidentiality block cipher modes. Indeed, CTR can be considered the best and most modern way to achieve privacyonly encryption [19] . The basic operation for both modes is shown in Fig. 3 .
As far as the authors know, there is no stream cipher proposal able to preserve the format of the plaintext symbols. The main stream cipher proposals are oriented to generate binary keystreams, as the finalists of eSTREAM project [20] or the well-known solution formed by secure block ciphers in CTR mode. Due to this absence, we consider that the use of the recent FPE modes approved by NIST in conjunction with CTR mode could be a good solution.
IV. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

A. FPE With CTR Mode
Assuming that the plaintext is a stream of symbols defined with radix R, we can define the CTR mode for our purpose Algorithm 1: CTR mode for FPE encryption.
as described by NIST [21] but using a modulo-R addition as encryption operation instead of an XOR. For a family of functions The decryption algorithm will be as Algorithm 1, but replacing the plaintext P with the ciphertext C and the modulo-R addition by a modulo-R subtraction.
According to [22] and posterior studies, it can be shown that in the sense of IND-CPA (indistinguishability against chosenplaintext attacks) security, given an adversary X attacking a CTR scheme, it's possible to built an adversary Y attacking the PRF security of the underlying function F K of that CTR scheme. The advantages, ADV, of such adversaries are related as
Also according to its proof, it can be concluded that it holds independently of the radix R on which the CTR mode operates. On the other hand, according to the PRF-PRP switching lemma [22] and since the underlying function F K is a block cipher that can be considered a pseudorandom permutation (PRP), it is well-known that the cited advantage is degraded by a term of
where Q is the number of queries made by the adversary Y and B is the blocksize of the blockcipher. In the case of an FPE block cipher with radix R, this factor will be Q 2 /2R B . Indeed, due to the birthday paradox, it could be considered insecure to encrypt more than Q = √ R B blocks with the same key. It is possible to conclude that, in the same way that the use of CTR mode with a standard block cipher is considered safe, we can safely use the CTR mode with an FPE block cipher. On the other hand, it will be important to take into account that the block size B is a configurable parameter for FPE block ciphers, and it affects the overall security of the CTR scheme.
One requisite for B could be to provide the same security limit as a recommended block cipher with a 128-bit blocksize. For AES working in CTR mode, Q = 2 64 , then the data limit to be transmitted before key refreshing should be lower than L = Q · 128 = 2 71 bits. As the proposed system in this paper should have at least the same bound, we have taken as design constraint the requisite
where B is the blocksize in symbols defined with radix R and b is the information bits represented by each symbol in the encoding standard. This constraint gives a lower bound for B and it is taken into account in Section V, where the cipher parameters are explained.
B. Keystream Analysis
It is well-known that one of the security criteria of a stream cipher is based on the fact that the generated keystream is indistinguishable from a truly random sequence. Therefore, it is useful to check the randomness of the obtained keystream se- Fig. 4 .
Among the most used tests for randomness, we can highlight some of them such as NIST [23] , Diehard [24] , or TestU01 [25] . All of them need as input a binary stream or a sequence of integers within a range that is a power of two. In our case, the keystream values are not included in a range like that due to the encoding used. The range of possible values for the keystream will be explained later in Sections V and VI. As far as the authors know, there is no standardized set of tests able to check the randomness of a sequence of integer numbers that are not included in a power of two ranges. However, the battery of tests proposed by Knuth [26] does include different tests that are suitable for our purpose, as they do not have the mentioned constraint.
In this paper, the keystream resulting from our FPE implementation was evaluated applying the following tests described in [26] : frequency test, serial test for pairs and triples of symbols, poker test, run and serial correlation test.
Regarding frequency and serial test, chi-square goodness-offit test was applied successfully with 5% and 1% of significance As for the poker test, chi-square goodness-of-fit test was also applied using the five categories described by Knuth [26] .
With respect to the run test, it was applied to runs up and down successfully for sequences of 5000 values.
Correlation coefficient was calculated for a window of 25 000 samples and shifts up to 100 000, giving a result between the bounds recommended for this test.
Although the fulfillment of a statistical test does not guarantees that the sequence is truly random, we can conclude that the generated sequence is suitable as keystream for the proposed stream cipher.
V. APPLICATION CASE: ETHERNET 1000BASE-X
In this paper, we have focused on the case of high-speed communications, particularly in the 1000Base-X standard used in optical Gigabit Ethernet links. In this standard, the PCS level is responsible for generating and encoding control and data symbols that are transmitted to the optical line. As the block line coding is 8b/10b, the purpose of the encryption will be to cipher the complete 8b/10b symbol flow as shown in Fig. 2 .
The main advantage of the proposed method is that there is no throughput loss because no extra data fields are added to the packets when they are encrypted, then no overhead is introduced. Moreover, it not only encrypts the contents of the packets, but also the activity or data traffic pattern. This is because by encrypting at 8b/10b symbol level, control symbols and ordered sets are also encrypted, such as packet start and end symbols or IDLE sets in the interframe gap (IFG). This last capacity could improve security as it prevents passive eavesdroppers from performing traffic analysis attacks. It would be useful in scenarios where traffic pattern analysis could reveal sensitive information about the behavior of a critical infrastructure or facility.
The dataset to be encrypted is a limited set, since the valid 8b/10b symbols are composed of 256 data symbols plus 12 control symbols, a total of 268 symbols that do not generate code errors. On the other hand, the special control symbol /K28.7/ used only in diagnostic functions is capable of generating an undesired Ethernet "comma" sequence if it coincides sequentially with some particular symbols [27] . A comma across any two adjacent code-groups may cause code-group realignment. Symbol /K28.7/ is not used for standard data communication, and in order to avoid the accidental generation of it in the encryption of any 8b/10b symbol it has been excluded from the encryption symbol mapping.
Therefore, the valid set of symbols consists of 267 possible values to be encrypted. As in Fig. 2 , in order to carry out the encryption, the 267 possible symbols are mapped in the range of 0 to 266, giving a value of 267 for radix parameter R. After symbol mapping, modulo-R addition is performed with the keystream. Once the cipher operation is done, the resulting values are reverse-mapped to the corresponding new 8b/10b symbol. The new symbols will generate neither code error nor realignment as they exist in the set of 267 possible symbols and /K28.7/ has been excluded from it.
To generate the keystream, an FPE block cipher in CTR mode has been built. Among the two NIST recommendations, FF1 and FF3, we have selected the latter. FF1 mode is not as limited in block length as FF3, since its specification says that it can reach up to 2 32 symbols; therefore, a greater security could be achieved. However, since for FF3 mode fewer rounds are required in the Feistel network, the cost in hardware resources is lower. In this mode, the block size is limited according to the radix used, mathematically expressed as follows:
where R is the radix, and minlen and maxlen are the bounds for the block size B. Since radix is 267, according to (4) , block size B is between 2 and 22.
On the other hand, according to (1), for R = 267 and b = 8 information bits/symbol, B should be greater than or equal to 16; therefore, it is possible to achieve this value using FF3 mode, as 22 is the maximum allowable value for B.
In this paper, the selected value for block size is the maximum, it means 22. The maximum block size means a greater number of cycles available per stage for a possible pipelined architecture, which allows for a better reuse of the resources consumed by the hardware.
Given these parameters, the structure of the full streaming encryption system is shown in Fig. 6 . It is similar to Fig. 2 , but the keystream generator module has been replaced with the final CTR structure based on FPE block cipher.
In Fig. 6 , TX_PCS_CTRL module represents the PCS controller that generates the 8b/10b symbol flow. Each symbol is formed by its 8-bit value D in and the control flag K in. This control flag signals if the 8b/10b symbol is a control or data one, depending if its value is "1" or "0", respectively. Both signals D in and K in are the input to the cipher. The encrypted output is a new 8b/10b symbol formed by D out and K out, and it is the input of the encoder. 6 . Overall structure for the streaming encryption system in a physical layer with 8b/10b encoding. Decryption will be as encryption but using a modulo-267 subtraction instead of an addition.
In this structure, for each clock cycle, a modulo-22 counter (called "cnt_mod_22" in Fig. 6 ) selects one of the 22 symbols from the output block of the FPE block cipher. In Fig. 6 , these symbols are represented by the set {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S 21 }. The selected output symbol will be added to the incoming plaintext, thanks to the modulo-267 addition. The FPE output block is refreshed every 22 cycles. The same happens with its input block that comes from CTR counter (called COUNTER in Fig. 6 ). This COUNTER will also increment its value every 22 cycles.
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
A. System Description FF3 encryption algorithm is described in [14] , and it implements a nonbinary Feistel network. In this paper, the cipher tweak value has been set to zero, and only the key is configurable. By taking into account the parameters that we need for our system (radix R = 267 and block size B = 22), the hardware structure for the FPE block cipher can be particularized and represented as shown in Fig. 7 , where the main functions are implemented in modules REV, NUM, STR, AES, and mod 267 11 , all of them are described in [14] . In this implementation, AES module has a key size of 128 bits.
The width of the data bus in each branch of the Feistel network is 11 symbols, i.e., half of the block size.
This design has a pipelined architecture to achieve the required throughput; as blocksize is 22, for every 22 cycles 22 symbols are generated in the block cipher output and each stage in the pipeline can last at most 22 cycles. Each round can be implemented in several stages and its number depends on the functions that it carries out. Particularly, in this implementation, function REV takes zero stages, NUM and AES take one stage, STR takes 10 stages, and mod 267 11 takes two stages.
B. Implementation Results
The system described in Fig. 7 has been implemented in a Xilinx Virtex 7 field programmable gate array (FPGA). Regarding the resources used for the FPE block cipher, these are shown Table I in terms of look-up tables (LUTs), registers, and block RAMs. In this design, no digital signal processing cell has been used. Table I also shows a resource comparison with other implementations, particularly with [16] , where FF1 and FF3 modes are implemented. Such implementations use an iterative looping architecture that saves resources but increments the number of cycles to carry out one block encryption. Although it is difficult to establish a comparison, it has been made in terms of throughput/resources. Among the three modes studied in [16] , only FF1 and FF3 modes have been selected for the comparison, as FF2 was removed from NIST recommendation.
As shown in Table I , the proposed system in this paper entails a throughput/resources ratio better than that of the existing FPE implementations. This comparison is only orientative as FPGA devices used in both implementations are different. While in [16] , implementation is made over a Virtex-6 device, in this paper, Virtex-7 is used. Anyways, in both devices, the CLB structure is similar in terms of LUTs and registers, with four six-input LUTs and eight registers per slice. Also, it is important to remark that in this paper the necessary radix is 267. It implies that mod 267 11 and STR modules are more complex to implement than the cases where radix is a power of two. In the latter division and modulo, operations could simply be reduced to shifting and slicing operations over bit vectors.
C. Encryption Setup
To test the proposed encryption system, the overall system described in Fig. 6 has been integrated in a 1000Base-X Ethernet interface linked to an Ethernet frame generator. Two chains, each consisting of an Ethernet interface and Ethernet frame generator, have been implemented over a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. In the setup for test, the Ethernet interfaces have been connected to two small form-factor pluggable (SFP) modules suitable for Gigabit Ethernet standard over multimode fiber. The overall setup scheme and a photo of the hardware system are shown in Figs. 8 and 9 , respectively. In Fig. 10 , the structure of the Ethernet interface is shown. Ethernet frame generators have been used to check the encrypted link with real traffic and verify that no frames are lost and no cyclic redundancy check (CRC) errors are produced during encryption.
The final PCS structure, shown in Fig. 10 , contains the encryption and decryption modules. In the 8b/10b TX datapath, the latency introduced by the encryption module TX_ENCRYPT is 192 ns, and approximately the same for the RX datapath. In addition, no overhead is introduced in the encryption process; thus, a 100% throughput is achieved.
These values of latency and throughput are a doubtless improvement with respect to other encryption mechanisms, such as IPsec. As an example, in [28] latency measurements made over commercial equipment that implements IPsec give values between 50 and 350 ms. Moreover, the inherent overhead introduced by IPsec during encryption limits the throughput of these equipment to values between 20% and 90% of the maximum achievable.
D. Encryption Results
Different
Ethernet traffic patterns have been tested. Particularly, no frame transmission and transmission of frames with randomized payload at different rates have been encrypted. Patterns have been named A, B, C, and D. A corresponds with the case of no frame transmission, where only IDLES are transmitted over the link. B, C, and D correspond to continuous frame transmission of 1024-bytes length at rates of 10.2%, 50%, and 91% of the maximum Gigabit line rate, respectively.
As mentioned previously, the proposed encryption system is able to make indistinguishable data traffic patterns. Regarding to this capability, it is interesting to monitor the signal waveform at the input of the 8b/10b encoder. As shown in Figs. 6 and 10, the output of the encryption is the input of the encoder, and it is formed by the 8b/10b symbol value D out and its K control flag (named K out). Each 8b/10b symbol is a control or data one depending on whether its K flag is "1" or "0," respectively. D out and K out are used by the 8b/10b encoder to encode an 8-bit symbol into a 10-bit one.
K control flag pattern has been monitored for each of the mentioned traffic patterns (from A to D) with the encryption activated and deactivated.
When the encryption is not enabled in the case of A pattern, where no frames are transmitted, K control flag waveform is a signal that switches continuously between "0" and "1," as shown in Fig. 11(a) . It is because when no frame is transmitted, the physical layer controller (TX_PCS_CTRL module in Fig. 10 ) transmits continuously IDLE sets to the 8b/10b encoder. These IDLE sets are composed by two consecutive symbols, the control symbol /K28.5/ (with K flag equals to "1") plus a data symbol (with K flag equals to "0").
However, with encryption disabled for patterns B, C, and D, the K flag waveform seems a blast signal, as IDLE transmission only occurs in the IFG between frames, and during frame transmission only 8b/10b data symbols are transmitted (setting K flag continuously to "0"). It is shown in Fig. 11(b) .
On enabling encryption, the K flag waveform is completely randomized in all cases, A, B, C, and D, making indistinguishable which pattern is being transmitted, as shown in Fig. 11(c) .
As an overall result of encryption, Shannon entropy (SE) has been measured for each of the mentioned patterns before and after encryption as
The 8b/10b symbol stream for each traffic pattern, mapped between 0 and R − 1, has been grouped in tuples of n symbols, called β n , and the probability for each tuple P (β n ) has been calculated. Particularly, SE has been measured for values of n from 1 to 3 in each of the mentioned patterns A, B, C, and D. For each n, 1, 2, and 3, the length of the used sequences has been 2.67, 14.26, and 571 M samples, respectively.
Because in (5) logarithms with base 2 are used, the SE result is given in bits/symbol. Ideally, if every n-tuple (β n ) is equally likely with probability P (β n ) = p = R −n , the value of SE for every n is given as
Owing to the limited memory in FPGA hardware resources, measurements for each pattern have been calculated at simulation stage, but this fact does not invalidate experimental results.
In Fig. 12 , values of SE with n from 1 to 3 and for patterns A, B, C, and D are shown. These values are compared with a fifth case named E, which corresponds to the randomized signal after encryption of pattern A, which can be considered the worst case in terms of entropy. In this last pattern E, it is possible to notice that SE is, as expected, almost the ideal value, i.e., 8.0606. However, as the transmission rate decreases from D to A, the SE value also decreases. It is a logical result, as when a lower bandwidth transmission is used, IFGs full of IDLES take more bandwidth percentage versus the random payloads of the transmitted frames.
Thank to this result, it is possible to conclude that encryption works and makes indistinguishable data traffic patterns, which permits hiding of the pattern and contents of Ethernet traffic from any passive eavesdropper.
VII. CONCLUSION
As far as the authors are aware, this paper was the first time that an encryption mechanism was proposed for ciphering physical layer communications based on 8b/10b coding. This new encryption system consists of symmetric ciphering of the complete 8b/10b symbol stream. Encryption based on an FPE block cipher working in CTR mode was simulated and implemented. Also, security considerations were taken into account. The proposed system was able to obfuscate the data traffic pattern, which could improve the overall security, with no throughput losses, null overhead, and low latency.
These properties make this kind of "in-flight" encryption suitable for protocols where delay and jitter are critical, such as the real-time Ethernet in industrial environments, which would improve security in modern optical SCADA networks.
In addition to this, by preserving coding properties such as dcbalance, short run length, and transition density, physical layer encryption was easily achieved without making changes in the subsequent hardware elements or medium-dependent circuitry. As an example, in Ethernet 1000Base-X standard, SERDES (Serializer/Deserializer), and commercial SFP, optical modules could be compatible with the proposed encryption system.
Regarding its implementation, although in the proposed system there was an increment in the hardware resources with respect a standard AES block cipher, this system entails a throughput/resources ratio better than that of the existing FPE implementations.
Finally, as future work, authors consider studying the implementation of physical layer encryption for other Ethernet standards with higher transmission rates such as 10G-BaseR.
